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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Aladdin Bail Bonds (“Aladdin”)1 appeals from the district court’s order 
denying its motion to exonerate the bail posted on behalf of Travis Wharton. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
The state charged Travis Eugene Wharton with trafficking in marijuana 
and obstructing and/or delaying an officer after law enforcement conducted a 
traffic stop and discovered in excess of 31 pounds of marijuana in the rental car 
Wharton was driving.  (R., pp.12-16, 19-20, 54-55.)  The magistrate set bail in the 
amount of $100,000.00, which Aladdin posted on Wharton’s behalf.  (R., pp.23, 
107.)  After bail was posted, Wharton returned to Iowa where he lived at the time 
he was arrested in Idaho.  (See R., pp.12, 70, 76, 95.) 
Wharton filed a motion to suppress, but did not appear at the suppression 
hearing because he “became ill” while traveling from Iowa.  (R., pp.73-76.)  
Wharton filed a doctor’s “excus[e]” for his absence.  (R., pp.76, 79.)  Wharton 
also failed to appear at the second date set for the suppression hearing claiming 
he was unable to appear due to a back injury.  (R., p.80.)  Although the court 
initially issued a warrant for Wharton’s arrest and “cancel[led]” his bond, it later 
                                            
1 Aladdin is the agent for American Contractors Indemnity Company.  (See R., 
p.107 (noting Aladdin posted Wharton’s bond “as the authorized agent for 
American Contractors Indemnity Company”).)  Although the district court 
“recognize[d] that Aladdin Bail Bonds is an assumed name under which Two Jinn 
Inc. conducts business,” it referred to “Two Jinn by its assumed name,” Aladdin, 
as that is how it was referred to in the pleadings.  (R., p.134 n.1; see also, pp.91-
92, 95, 107-111; but see p.104.)  On appeal, however, Aladdin refers to itself as 
both Aladdin and Two Jinn.  (See generally Appellant’s brief). 
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withdrew the warrant and advised defense counsel that Wharton would be 
required to appear at the next hearing.  (R., pp.80-82.)  Wharton failed to appear 
at the next hearing, which was held on September 28, 2015.  (R., p.87.)  As a 
result, the court issued a “no bond” warrant for Wharton’s arrest and ordered 
Wharton’s prior bail forfeited.  (R., pp.87, 134.)  The court sent notice of the 
forfeiture to Aladdin the following day – September 29, 2015 – advising Aladdin 
of its intent to “discharge the order of forfeiture if Mr. Wharton was not brought 
before the Court within 180 days of the order of forfeiture.”  (See R., p.134.)  
“On March 24, 2016, three days before the expiration of the 180 day time 
period,” Aladdin filed a motion to set aside the forfeiture and exonerate the bail.  
(R., pp.91-92, 134.)  In support of the motion, Aladdin submitted the affidavit of 
Shaun Skogrand, a bond recovery agent.  (R., pp.94,100.)  In his affidavit, 
Skogrand detailed his efforts to locate Wharton.  (R., pp.94-103.)  Aladdin also 
submitted the affidavit of Lynn Mirajkar, stating she assigned the case to 
Skogrand on October 1, 2015, and received notice of the forfeiture on October 7, 
2015.  (R., pp.104-105.)  Aladdin argued that its request to set aside the 
forfeiture and exonerate the bail should be granted because it “diligently sought 
and located Wharton and informed the appropriate authorities of Wharton’s 
location” once he was located in custody in Colorado.  (R., p.110.)   
The state objected to Aladdin’s motion because the 180-day exoneration 
period had expired and Wharton had not yet “appeared before the Court.”  (R., 
p.123.)  Aladdin filed a response to the state’s objection after which the court 
held a hearing on Aladdin’s motion.  (R., pp.126-129, 131.)  Wharton was not 
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present at that hearing, and had still not appeared before the court.  (R., pp.131, 
134.)  Following the hearing, the court entered a written decision denying 
Aladdin’s motion to set aside the forfeiture and exonerate the bail.  (R., pp.133-
157.)  Aladdin timely appealed.  (R., pp.170-173.)  The district court granted 
Aladdin’s request to stay remittance of the forfeiture while the appeal is pending.  
(R., pp.159-169, 204.)               
  4 
ISSUE 
 
 Aladdin states the issues on appeal as follows: 
 
1. Did the district court err by abusing its discretion in denying 
Appellant’s Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Exonerate Bond? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.3.) 
 
 
 The state rephrases the issue on appeal as follows: 
 
Has Aladdin failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
determining that Aladdin’s efforts to locate and apprehend Wharton could not be 
considered pursuant to I.C.R. 46(h)(1)(B) absent evidence that Aladdin 
undertook those efforts as an agent of American Contractors, which was the 
entity that posted Wharton’s bond? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
Aladdin Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of Its Motion To Set Aside The 
Forfeiture 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Aladdin argues that the district court’s order denying its motion to set 
aside the forfeiture and exonerate bail should be reversed.2  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.1-3.)  More specifically, Aladdin asserts that although “the district court 
properly weighed most factors enumerated under Rule 46(h),” it “acted outside 
the boundaries of its discretion and acted inconsistently with applicable legal 
standards when it failed to consider Two Jinn’s [aka Aladdin’s] efforts to locate 
and apprehend Defendant Wharton under either I.C.R. 46(h)(1)(B) or, in the 
alternative, as an additional relevant factor under I.C.R. 46(h)(1).”  (Appellant’s 
brief, p.5.)  Aladdin’s claim fails because Aladdin has failed to show error in the 
district court’s conclusion that Aladdin failed to present evidence to support a 
finding that it was acting as American Contractors’ agent when it undertook 
efforts to locate and apprehend Wharton and, as such, there was no evidence 
that American Contractors participated in locating and apprehending Wharton for 
the purpose of I.C.R. 46(h)(1)(B), or any other provision of the rule.   
 
                                            
2 Because the district court denied Aladdin’s request to set aside the forfeiture, it 
did not consider whether exoneration of bail was appropriate.  (R., pp.133-157.)  
Thus, although Aladdin’s appellate argument includes references to exoneration, 
the only question properly before this Court is whether the district court’s decision 
denying Aladdin’s request to set aside the forfeiture was an abuse of discretion.  
See I.C. § 19-2917(4) (providing for exoneration if forfeiture is set aside).  
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B. Standard Of Review 
 
“In general, a trial court has discretion over bond forfeiture matters, and 
we review such decisions for abuse of discretion.”  State v. Two Jinn, Inc., 148 
Idaho 752, 754-755, 228 P.3d 1019, 1021-1022 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. 
Vargas, 141 Idaho 485, 111 P.3d 621 (Ct. App. 2005)).  In determining whether a 
trial court abused its discretion, this Court considers “(1) whether the court 
correctly perceived the issue was one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted 
within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether it 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”  State v. Two Jinn, Inc., 151 
Idaho 725, 728, 264 P.3d 66, 69 (2011) (citation omitted).  
 
C. Aladdin Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Decision 
Declining To Set Aside The Forfeiture  
 
 If a motion is filed within 180 days after an order forfeiting bail, “the court 
that ordered the forfeiture may direct that the order of forfeiture be set aside, in 
whole or in part . . . as provided by rules adopted by the supreme court, if it 
appears that justice so requires.”  I.C. § 19-2917.  Idaho Criminal Rule 46(h)(1) 
provides that, in ruling on a motion to set aside a forfeiture, the court “shall 
consider all relevant factors, which may include but not be limited to:” 
(A)  The willfulness of the defendant’s violation of the obligation to 
appear; 
 
(B)  the participation of the person posting bail in locating and 
apprehending the defendant; 
 
(C)  the costs, inconvenience, and prejudice suffered by the state 
as a result of the defendant’s violation of the obligation to appear; 
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(D)  any intangible costs; 
 
(E)  the public’s interest in insuring a defendant’s appearance; 
 
(F)  any mitigating factors; 
 
(G)  whether the state exhibited any actual interest in regaining 
custody of the defendant through prompt efforts to extradite him; 
 
(H)  whether the bonding company has attempted to assist or 
persuade the defendant to expedite his return to Idaho by 
exercising his rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 
Idaho Code § 19-5001 et seq.; and 
 
(I)  the need to deter the defendant and others from future 
violations.   
 
Aladdin filed a motion to set aside the forfeiture within the 180-day time 
period required by I.C. § 19-2917.  In ruling on Aladdin’s motion, the district court 
expressly considered the factors set forth in I.C.R. 46(h)(1) and concluded that 
justice did not require setting aside the forfeiture.  (R., pp.133-157.)  On appeal, 
Aladdin acknowledges the “district court properly weighed most factors 
enumerated under Rule 46(h),” but contends the district court abused its 
discretion by “fail[ing] to consider Two Jinn’s efforts to locate and apprehend” 
Wharton under I.C.R. 46(h)(1)(B), or as “an additional relevant factor under I.C.R. 
46(h)(1).”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.)  A review of the record shows that Aladdin 
has failed to show error in this regard.  
Factor (B) of I.C.R. 46(h)(1) provides for consideration of “the participation 
of the person posting bail in locating and apprehending the defendant.”  
Addressing this factor, the district court first determined that the “person posting 
bail” “is the person who is liable to secure Mr. Wharton’s obligation to the State 
under the suretyship contract and against whom the judgment may enter for that 
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amount,” and concluded “it is clear from the bond that American Contractors 
Indemnity Company is liable to the State for the amount of bail in the event of Mr. 
Wharton’s failure to appear in Court.”  (R., p.143; see also p.144 (“In this case, 
the Court concludes American Contractors is the ‘person who posted bail’ for 
purposes of this rule.”).)  In reaching this conclusion, the district court quoted the 
following language from the bond:  “‘[i]f the forfeiture of the bond be ordered by 
the Court, judgment may be summarily made and entered forthwith against the 
said American Contractors Indemnity Company, a California corporation, for the 
amount of its undertaking herein as provide by State law.’”  (R., pp.143-144.) 
Having concluded that American Contractors was the “person posting 
bail,” the district court then addressed Aladdin’s relationship to American 
Contractors.  (R., pp.144-145.)  The court stated: 
From the caption of its motion, Aladdin appears to be 
asserting that it is “an agent” of American Contractors.  While it fails 
to specifically articulate this argument, the Court presumes Aladdin 
intends that its actions to locate and apprehend the defendant be 
attributed to the surety for this motion because Aladdin and the 
surety have some agency relationship.  The problem, of course, is 
that Aladdin has presented no evidence to show that an agency 
relationship exists between it and American Contractors and if one 
does what the nature and scope of the relationship might be.  In its 
memorandum in support of its motion, Aladdin asserts that “Aladdin 
posted a $100,000 bond for Defendant Travis Wharton as the 
authorized agent for American Contractors Indemnity Company.”  
(Mem.in Supp. Mtn. p. 1).  As proof of this proposition, Aladdin cites 
to the “court file.”  Id.  The only place Aladdin’s name appears in the 
Court file is at the top of the bond itself.  Aladdin is listed as the 
agent designated by American Contractors to receive notices 
pursuant to I.C. §19-2915(3).  The Court has no evidence showing 
that Aladdin was also listed in the records of the Idaho Department 
of Insurance to receive notices on American Contractors behalf 
pursuant to I.C.R. 46(h)(3).  Aladdin’s name and address also 
appeared on the bond in the space designated for the “Bail Agent’s 
Address Stamp.”  As discussed above, to be a ‘bail agent’ under 
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Idaho law an individual or company must be licensed by the 
Department of Insurance.  While Mr. Barrera signed the form 
indicating he is licensed and provided what appeared to be a 
license number, there is nothing in the Court’s file suggesting Two-
Jinn (Aladdin’s real name) is licensed as a corporation.  Again, 
when Mr. Barrera signed the bond there is no indication he was 
signing on behalf of Aladdin.  Even if Aladdin was the bail agent, 
there is nothing in the Court’s record from which the Court could 
conclude that Aladdin will ultimately be responsible for paying the 
bail amount if it is forfeited.  The bond contract makes American 
Contractors liable for that payment.  What, if any, agreement or 
relationship exists between American Contractors and Aladdin has 
not been shown or even argued to the Court. 
 
(R., p.144-145.)   
The district court then noted that it was not “ignorant of the way the bail 
bond industry works,” and assumed Aladdin was “not expending the resources to 
hire a private investigator to fly around the country in an attempt to track Mr. 
Wharton down unless Aladdin has some exposure for the bail liability or 
someone is compensating it for those services”; “[h]owever, none of that [was] in 
the record before th[e] Court.”  (R., pp.145-146.)  The court also stated that even 
if such evidence was in the record, the court was “not sure the analysis would 
change” because “American Contractors would still be the ‘person posting bail’ 
even if they had subsequently passed the risk of that undertaking onto someone 
else.  If the order of forfeiture ‘becomes’ a judgment under I.C. § 19-2918 the 
judgment would be against American Contractors.”  (R., p.146.)  Thus, the district 
court concluded that because there was “no evidence American Contractors took 
any actions to locate and apprehend the defendant after his failure to appear,” 
factor (B) “weigh[ed] against setting aside the forfeiture of bail.”  (R., p.146.)   
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Aladdin contends that the district court’s “factual determination” that “there 
was no evidence indicating that Two Jinn [aka Aladdin] was ‘the party posting 
bond,’” was “simply wrong” because the “power of attorney form attached to the 
bond in question issued by American Contractors” authorized Aladdin to act as 
its “attorney-in-fact” for purposes of executing the bond.3  (Appellant’s brief, p.7.)  
Aladdin contends this was “[s]ufficient evidence” that it “acted on behalf and as 
an agent of American Contractors” in attempting to locate and apprehend 
Wharton.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8.)  Aladdin’s argument ignores the crux of the 
district court’s analysis.  The district court noted that while Aladdin was “listed as 
the agent designated by American Contractors to receive notices pursuant to I.C. 
§ 19-2915(3),” and noted that “Aladdin’s name and address also appeared on the 
bond in the space designated for the ‘Bail Agent’s Address Stamp,’” neither was 
sufficient to show that Aladdin was American Contractors’ agent for purposes of 
posting bail and being liable for any judgment if bail was forfeited.  (R., pp.187-
188.)  The district court reasoned that Aladdin was required to produce evidence 
that it was acting on American Contractors’ behalf in its efforts to locate and 
apprehend Wharton and, having failed to do so, American Contractors could not 
benefit from Aladdin’s efforts under I.C.R. 46(h)(1)(B).  (R., pp.186-188.)  Aladdin 
asks this Court to assume a relationship that the district court found was 
unsupported by evidence.  This Court should decline to do so.   
                                            
3 It does not appear that the bail contract referred to by the district court and 
Aladdin has been included in the record on appeal.  “[M]issing portions of the 
record must be presumed to support the action of the trial court.”  Grant v. State, 
156 Idaho 598, 605 n.5, 329 P.3d 380, 387 n.5 (Ct. App. 2014). 
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Aladdin alternatively argues that, “even if the district court correctly 
determined that Two Jinn’s [aka Aladdin’s] efforts at locating and apprehending 
Wharton should not be considered pursuant to the enumerated factor set forth in 
I.C.R. 46(h)(1)(B), the district court should have” considered its efforts as a 
“relevant factor” under I.C.R. 46(h)(1).  (Appellant’s brief, p.9.)  This argument 
fails because it is not preserved.  In fact, it is exactly contrary to Aladdin’s 
position below.  In the district court, Aladdin argued that the court could only 
consider the factors enumerated in I.C.R. 46(h)(1) in determining whether to set 
aside the forfeiture.  (R., pp.127-128.)  In its response to the state’s objection, 
Aladdin expressly argued the court should “only consider relevant factors 
enumerated and pursuant to I.C.R. 46(h).  (R., p.128.)  Although the district court 
rejected Aladdin’s claim that I.C.R. 46(h) was limited to the enumerated factors, it 
did not consider Aladdin’s efforts to locate and apprehend Wharton as a non-
enumerated relevant factor.  (R., pp.155-156.)  However, Aladdin never asked 
the court to do so.  Because Aladdin failed to present the issue to the district 
court, and, in fact, argued against consideration of non-enumerated factors, he 
cannot claim error in the district court’s failure to consider the issue below.  See 
State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 420, 348 P.3d 1, 35 (2015) (“The invited error 
doctrine precludes a criminal defendant from ‘consciously’ inviting district court 
action and then successfully claiming those actions are erroneous on appeal.”); 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010) (absent a showing 
of fundamental error, appellate court will not consider claims raised for the first 
time on appeal).      
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Even if Aladdin had not waived its claim that the court should have 
considered its efforts to locate and apprehend Wharton as a non-enumerated, 
relevant consideration under I.C.R. 46(h)(1), Aladdin fails to explain why the 
district court’s agency analysis would be any different.  Indeed, in addressing 
other relevant factors, the court found that “knowledge of the surety of the risk it 
[was] accepting to be relevant.”  (R., p.156.)  However, because the court had 
“no information about what relationship Aladdin ha[d] with American Contractors 
or its agent, Mr. Barrera,” the court did “not consider th[e] argument, like it [did] 
not consider[ ] Aladdin’s efforts at recovery.”  (R., p.156.)  Thus, if the district 
court’s analysis under I.C.R. 46(h)(1)(B) was correct, it was equally correct under 
I.C.R. 46(h)(1).    
Aladdin has failed to show that the district court erred in denying its motion 
to set aside the forfeiture. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
order denying Aladdin’s motion to set aside the forfeiture. 
DATED this 6th day of February, 2017. 
 
 
 
_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello______ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 6th day of February, 2017, served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an 
electronic copy to: 
 
 CHRISTOPHER D. SHERMAN 
 NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
 
at the following email addresses: csherman@nbmlaw.com and lm@nbmlaw.com.  
 
 
 
_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello_______ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 
Deputy Attorney General 
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